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By Matthew Creelman
[The author, a journalist based in Guatemala City since 1985, frequently writes on economic issues
and events in Guatemala and Central America.]
While politically 1994 was a watershed year in Guatemala with a national referendum that led
to the early dismissal of the legislature and the Supreme Court, important advances in peace
negotiations to end the country's 34-year civil war, and the arrival of a permanent United Nations
mission to verify human rights conditions the economy remained for the most part insulated from
the effects of the protracted institutional crisis and the ebb and flow of the peace process. In 1994,
the Guatemalan economy grew 4%, fueled by an improvement in world prices for traditional exports
and the continued growth of nontraditionals.
At the same time, inflation remained below 12%, the dollar exchange rate was stable throughout the
year, and net international reserves grew to US$786 million. These indicators of moderate growth
(1.2% per capita, if population growth is factored in) and price stability demonstrated solid economic
resilience, since they were achieved despite the political turmoil that accompanied the national
referendum in January and congressional elections in August (see NotiSur, 02/04/94 and 08/19/94).
In fact, even some adverse economic developments throughout the year, such as Guatemala's
loss of its preferential trade status with the US because of the advent of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at the beginning of the year, were unable to deter the country's positive
macroeconomic performance.
In addition, President Ramiro de Leon Carpio's interim government elected in mid-1993 by the
National Congress following ex-president Jorge Serrano Elias's failed power grab and subsequent
forced exile has been far more successful than prior administrations in approving new tax measures,
avoiding costly strikes in the public sector, and negotiating new minimum wages in the private
sector. Still, notwithstanding the economy's stable performance, the failure of economic growth to
translate into notable socioeconomic improvements for the four-fifths of Guatemala's population
that lives below the poverty line led to an increase in social conflicts and instability in 1994,
including a marked rise in farm takeovers by agricultural workers, a jump in delinquency in
urban areas, and massive protests of public transportation rate increases at the end of the year.
Moreover, unemployment and underemployment continue to plague more than 50% of the workage population, while the existing system of unequal land tenure and distribution continues to
exclude the vast majority of the rural population from access to arable lands.
And, despite an increase in rural minimum wages in 1994 the first in three years wage hikes were
just barely enough to compensate for the loss of real income, eaten away by inflation during
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the same period. Meanwhile, de Leon Carpio's efforts to promote economic and institutional
"modernization" have won the support of much of the private sector, which generally views such
policies as a palatable alternative to the specter of prolonged economic crisis that would otherwise
come from endemic budget deficits. At the same time, the government's strict fiscal and monetary
policies are certainly seen by businesspeople as preferable to structural reforms that would directly
threaten their interests. And, the government's commitment to the privatization of state enterprises
in 1995 and its willingness to repress campesino protestors when they occupy private farms send
clear messages to the private sector that their fundamental interests are not at risk under the de
Leon administration.

Marked jump in export income in 1994
By far the most dynamic economic activities in 1994 were those linked to export production.
Earnings from traditional exports (coffee, sugar, bananas, and cardamom) increased 54%, from US
$563.5 million in 1993 to US$868.9 million last year. Coffee alone, due to high international prices,
brought in US$444.7 million, a 65% increase over 1993. Earnings from sugar also rose dramatically,
to US$216 million, representing a 55% increase compared with 1993. In addition to the increase
in world sugar prices, Guatemalan sugar producers won a 20% price hike for domestically sold
sugar, which brought the local retail price up to the same level as the US import price of US$0.22 per
pound. In recent years, the protected domestic market has become as important a source of income
for sugar producers as the US market.
The third most important export sector is the maquila or drawback garment industry, which
exported to the US market US$147 million worth of clothing in 1994. Some analysts, however,
believe that export figures tend to exaggerate the economic importance of maquila production, since
the value added to imported inputs is relatively low. Although these exports increased by 20% last
year, the future looks bleak for the Guatemalan garment industry. In 1994, 60 maquila factories in
Guatemala moved production to Mexico, to take advantage of the benefits from producing within
the NAFTA bloc. According to Labor Minister Gladys Morfin, 20,000 maquila jobs were lost during
the year. With the drastic devaluation of the Mexican peso, and Guatemala's loss of preferential
trade status, this exodus is likely to continue in 1995.
Despite the steady growth in recent years of nontraditional agricultural and manufactured exports,
Guatemala remains extremely dependent on coffee and sugar exports, which together exceed the
value of all nontraditional exports combined. The windfall profits for coffee producers caused by the
sharp rise in world prices brought to an end a three-year crisis experienced by coffee growers. As a
result, in mid- 1994 coffee producers granted workers a 25% wage increase, and they currently pay
the equivalent of US$2.50 a day for field work and US$3.50 per hundred-pound bag of picked coffee
beans. Still, while this marks a sizeable increase in harvest pay, wages continue to represent only
a fraction of the final value of the product. At current rates, a coffee picker would have to pick 150
pounds of coffee beans in the countryside to afford one pound of export-quality coffee in Guatemala
City.
The increase in export earnings last year principally brought about by improved world prices is
equivalent to 4% of the Gross Domestic Product. Imports, however, also increased sharply in 1994,
up 31%, resulting in a trade deficit of US$682 million. Nevertheless, the flow of dollars into the
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country from family remittances sent by Guatemalans working in the US, plus incoming foreign
aid and financial investment last year, allowed the government to maintain a high level of foreign
reserves, which in turn stabilized the exchange rate throughout the year. Hefty capital inflows help
keep inflation down Since 1991, economic authorities have made inflation control a priority over
economic growth.
The past two consecutive governments have resorted to high interest-bearing bonds to sop up
excess liquidity from the economy. Currently the government has more than Q8 billion quetzales
(about US$1.4 billion) outstanding in bond issues and in interest-paying required bank reserves.
These high-yielding government bonds have attracted dollars from abroad, which help buoy up the
level of net foreign reserves. By the end of 1994, these reserves reached US$786 million, exceeding
by US$50 million the International Monetary Fund's recommended level of accumulated reserves.
These measures stabilized the exchange rate and kept inflation in 1994 below 12%, despite the
uncertainty surrounding congressional elections in the first semester. As a result, by mid-year, the
Central Bank decided that it could loosen up monetary policy without spurring inflation. Since June,
the government has reduced reserve requirements for private banks and brought lending rates
down by 6 percentage points, to 16% for loans.
Access to capital, however, remains largely restricted to short-term borrowers, since banks still seem
to prefer to dabble in financial investment and currency speculation rather than provide housing
credits to consumers or loans to industries that produce for the domestic market. Meanwhile, the
government's difficulty in collecting taxes from the private sector contributed to a Q1,184 million
(US$1.00=Q5.60) budget deficit during 1994. Spending during the year was actually slightly less
than the budgeted amount, and by year-end the Q7,290 million in budgeted expenditures for 1994
was kept to Q6,569 million. Despite the financial difficulties, 77% of planned "social investment"
and infrastructure spending was executed, a relatively high proportion by Guatemalan standards.
Historically, a large part of the funds budgeted each year for ambitious anti-poverty programs and
social services has ended up being transferred to other budget categories to cover shortfalls.

New taxes approved for 1995
In late November, the new legislature approved a series of tax reforms that are expected to raise tax
income and decrease tax fraud and evasion during 1995. The package includes an increase in the
value added tax (Impuesto al Valor Agregado, IVA) from 7% to 10%.
The increase in IVA will go into effect either simultaneously with the signing of a peace accord
with the Guatemalan guerrillas since most of the newly generated income will finance social
development projects in rural areas or on January 1, 1996, whichever comes first. Corporate and
personal income taxes have also been increased, and a 1.5% tax on net assets was approved, along
with higher taxes on vehicle registration. Reforms will also lead to increased income from property
taxes and taxes on alcoholic beverages and soft drinks. At the same time, penalties have been
increased for tax crimes, and "red tape" has been reduced to close the loopholes that in the past
facilitated the nonpayment of consumer taxes by commercial establishments.
Finally, the Ministry of Finance is in the process of contracting a US firm to monitor foreign trade
and customs transactions in an attempt to reduce customs tax evasion. All told, the government
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expects the tax reforms to provide Q2,100 million in additional tax income during 1995. The 1995
budget of Q9,560 million is 45% greater than the Q6,569 million spent in 1994, and the Q6,929 million
in expected tax income is 43% above the Q4,828 million collected in 1994. De Leon Carpio is the first
president in the past decade to succeed in pushing through such a far-reaching tax reform.
Efforts in the past have been met with such strident private-sector opposition that politically shaken
governments have had to back down. De Leon Carpio's success to a large degree is due to the
fact that the legislature that approved his package is dominated by two conservative parties vying
for the presidency in 1996: the Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) and the Frente Republicano
Guatemalteco (FRG). Congressional leaders from both parties believe that since one of those two
organizations is almost certain to win the presidency in this year's general elections and thereby
control the executive in 1996, it would be far better for the current administration to pay the political
price for raising taxes.
In addition to the tax reform, the government hopes to raise revenue this year through the
privatization of state enterprises. On Nov. 25 five days before the congressional vote on tax reform
President de Leon announced the government's decision to rapidly place the state telephone
company, the national railway, the electrical generation and distribution institutes, and other
smaller state-run enterprises on the auction bloc. The promise of handing over to private investors
more than US$1 billion in state-held assets was clearly aimed at softening private-sector opposition
to the tax package, which in turn helped win congressional approval for the fiscal reform. Still,
the plans for privatization this year are bound to generate bitter conflicts with the country's labor
organizations, since the unions consider the fight against privatization to be a top priority for 1995.

-- End --
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